PAUL HENZE
Eritrea was decisively defeated by Ethiopia. As of late August 2000, Isaias Afewerki has only grudgingly recognised this defeat. His officials and propagandists continue to deny the extent of their defeat and the consequences for their political survival. It is not difficult to describe their predicament, but it is still not possible to foresee how they will cope with it. The problems that confront Eritrea are nevertheless clear. They all relate to facing reality.
Foremost comes the question of survivability of the leader and his ruling group. An authoritarian leader who embarks on a disastrous military adventure and fails seldom survives long in power. Examples in history are numerous. However, in recent years the world has witnessed the defeat of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Slobodan Milosevic in Yugoslavia. Both remain dictators in control of their beleaguered countries. Isaias Afewerki apparently aspires to the same outcome. And so do those who make up his immediate entourage.
Often, however, a defeated dictator must face disaffection among his closest associates which may culminate in efforts to replace him. Can Isaias be sure that none of the men around him may not try to oust him and set Eritrea on a new course? Some may be thinking such thoughts. An atmosphere of suspicion must prevail in the inner EPLF group. Whether and when this might lead to action only time will tell. During his final decline Mengistu Haile Maryam was faced by an attempted coup by disillusioned generals when he flew of to Berlin to seek aid from the East German regime to replace the assistance Gorbachev had cut off. Mengistu thwarted the hastily mounted coup and proceeded, months later, to execute several of the generals involved in it, even though his power was physically waning. Could Isaias repeat this kind of performance if faced with a coup? Isaias will probably try to revive the notion that EPLF Eritrea is a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism. He has already made accusations against Sudan. Sudan appears to have handled the awkward problem of dealing humanely with fleeing Eritrean soldiers and refugee civilians, but Isaias could find pretenses for accusations against Sudan if he judged it useful to pick a quarrel again in order to try to attract American or European backing. Another tactic available to Isaias to improve his international status would be to try to ally himself with any county judged to be in some way inimical to Ethiopia.
Egypt comes to mind in terms of controversy over Nile waters. Eritrea accounts for only a miniscule proportion of the water that flows into the Blue Nile. Eritrea is nevertheless entitled to participate in international discussions about Nile waters. In these Eritrea could act as spoiler to frustrate Ethiopia. Egypt, however, can hardly be regarded as an enemy of Ethiopia. The long history of Egyptian –Ethiopian relations, extending back to ancient times, is one of alternating competition and co-operation. Other concerned powers are urging both countries to co-operate in planning future utilisation of Nile waters and both countries are committed to peaceful resolution of Nile issues. Thus Eritrea’s chances of gaining support for harassment of Ethiopia through Egypt appear poor. Ethiopia has no active enemies either among neighbours or further afield. Isaias attempted to use Somalia as a base for harassing Ethiopia and gave support to OLF dissidents that enabled them to operate from Somali territory. This manoeuvre was notably unsuccessful.
Does Eritrea have the capacity to encourage opposition to the EPRDF inside Ethiopia? Before he sent his army into Ethiopia Isaias apparently let himself be convinced that the TPLF – led EPRDF government in Addis Ababa lacked widespread support. He failed to understand that multiple political parties and a lively private press function as a safety valve for political dissent in the democratising climate of Ethiopia. Contrary to what he said to me about the OLF in April 1993, he fell into the illusion the OLF could create instability in Oromo-dominated regions of Ethiopia. As I have stressed repeatedly in preceding chapters, the most significant effect of the Eritrean incursion into Ethiopia was to reinforce national feeling and dampen political dissidence.
Has Isaias recognised his faulty judgement? Persisting in this course of action would seem to be futile. A post – defeat Eritrean effort to continue fomenting disaffection in Ethiopia is likely to have quite the opposite effect. It will continue to reinforce Ethiopians’ appreciation of their present leaders. If Meles Zenawi and his colleagues capitalise on the victory over Eritrea by offering encouragement to critics and potential dissidents to join in the governing and development process they should have little difficulty maintaining the high standing they presently enjoy with the country’s entire population.
Defeated Eritrea’s standing among African countries is not high. Like Siad Barre’s Somalia in 1977, Isaias Afewerki violated one of the OAU’s most important principles: that border changes between African countries be effected only by peaceful means and agreement of the parties affected. During the two-year confrontation with Ethiopia Isaias and other high-level Eritrean officials have often lashed out against the OAU and accused it of subservience to Ethiopia. It will take a long period of reasonable behaviour on the part of Eritrea to live down its negative reputation. All its other neighbors have reason, given past history, to be sceptical of EPLF actions and intentions.
We now hear of manifestations of resistance among Eritreans to EPLF rule and, in particular, opposition to continued drafting of young men and women for military training. Loss of life among young Eritreans has been heavy. Their families want to be assured of the safety of sons and daughters who have survived. Beni Amer in some areas are reported to be refusing to let young men be taken for training. Ethnic groups that have a long record of scepticism about the EPLF – e.g., the Afars and the Kunama – have already organised groups abroad calling for democratisation of the Eritrean political system. Several long-existing groups of Eritreans in Europe and America have been energised to attempt to join together to challenge EPLF dominance. How effective they will be remains to be seen. History demonstrates that dictatorial regimes are usually toppled from the within rather than by exile pressure from abroad. If resentment of EPLF rule in Eritrea grows, however, pressures from both the outside and inside could combine to force the EPLF to moderate its rigid control, or even bring it to an end.
Can the EPLF convincingly change its colours? Moderation looks improbable in light of EPLF history. The EPLF attained dominance over other Eritrean guerrilla movements in the 1980s by employing strong tactics including assassination of rivals, severe measures against dissidents, and pitched battles with guerrilla opponents, driving rivals into Sudan or more distant exile. Even incidents of EPLF betrayal of competing Eritrean fighters to the Derg are known. Disillusioned foreign advisors have reported use of oppressive and punitive measures by the EPLF to deal with manifestations of dissatisfaction after independence. Isaias’s expulsion of NGOs from Eritrea in 1995 is explained by some observers as an effort to prevent outsiders from awareness of the EPLF’s style of rule in rural and provincial areas. Can the present embarrassed and defeated ruling group remake itself to be taken as genuine benefactors of the people? Isaias retains strong police and security services even if much of his military strength has been decimated. He will probably find it hard to resist the temptation to use harsh methods to enforce uniformity and suppress dissidence.
Isaias has mobilised the Eritrean diaspora to press Europeans and Americans for sympathy and emergency relief. Eritrean propaganda presents the country as the victim of Ethiopian invasion and stresses alleged Ethiopian atrocities against simple citizens, destruction of property, and theft of valuable goods. There is little substantiation for Eritrean claims. Warfare inevitably results in damage to property and dislocation of people. Ethiopia claims that its forces were under clear instructions to minimise destruction and do as little harm as possible to civilians. There is no reason to doubt this claim. Ethiopia disarmed all captured Eritrean soldiers and took possession of Eritrean military equipment and supplies as it was entitled to do by rules of warfare. Many of the allegations of Ethiopian misbehaviour that are spread by Eritrean media, Eritrean embassies and EPLF sympathisers abroad are intended to counteract the doubts of both the Eritrean population within the country and the diaspora. The aim is to create an illusory impression of continued EPLF vitality, and above all, to keep the diaspora sending money. Evidence was already accumulating by early 1999 that the flow of money from the diaspora was slowing. It would be surprising if it has not slowed further since Eritrea’s defeat.
The myth of Eritrean guerrilla invincibility is shattered. It is apparent to military professionals and students of military affairs that Eritrea relied on outdated and ineffective tactics in its assault on Ethiopia. On the other hand, Ethiopia’s offensive that resulted in Eritrean defeat was brilliantly conceived, for it was based on understanding of the most successful principles of modern warfare. Eritrea does not have the resources to rebuild its military forces. Who would give it the funds to replace lost and destroyed equipment? Eritrea has lost its attractiveness to international army merchants, for it is bankrupt. The 25-km border zone will hem Eritrea in and prevent future military harassment into Ethiopia. If Eritrea persists in harassment or evasion of the controls of UN peace-keepers, its compliance will immediately become an international issue. Though Isaias Afewerki has placed military preparedness above all other priorities since independence, this judgement has lost all logic. Who threatens Eritrea? While it threatened all its neighbours from 1993 onward, no neighbour took any action that amounted to a credible military threat against Eritrea. Like all authoritarian dictatorships Isaias had to invent threats and crises to justify maintaining an oppressive system over his own people.
An Eritrea that continues to be led by Isaias Afewerki and his EPLF will have difficulty again integrating itself into regional organisations promoting co-operation in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea area. A new Eritrea, committed to a responsible course of independent development in harmony with the rest of the region will be welcomed back into IGAAD, the Nile Basin community, and economic arrangements benefiting the whole area.
The Eritrean economy was functioning poorly when the attack on Ethiopia was mounted in May 1998. Two-thirds of its trade was with Ethiopia. Repeatedly Eritrean propagandists have claimed economic successes during the past two years. These claims defy common sense. There is no substantiation for them.
Nevertheless Eritrea may now be exaggerating the degree of hardship its population has suffered as a result of Ethiopian military action as a technique for obfuscating the fact that its economy had already been reduced to a state of severe crisis before the final Ethiopian action began. The World Food Program and the emergency aid programs of many governments and NGOs are now engaged in a major effort to sustain affected Eritreans. Prospects for a successful agricultural year are poor. Even in good years Eritrea has a food defecit. Drastic emergency measures and careful management will be good years Eritrea has a food defecit. Drastic emergency measures and careful management will be needed to prevent starvation and disease in Eritrea during the coming months – and perhaps years.
More could be said but even brief contemplation of Isaias’s predicament demonstrates that he faces formidable problems. Bluster and a continuing barrage of propaganda of denial will not ease them. A less stubborn man would consider stepping aside and letting new leaders take charge, admitting that the EPLF’s approach to managing Eritrean independence and setting the country on a positive course – as the whole world hoped would occur –was mistaken. New leadership in Eritrea genuinely committed to democratisation of the country would enjoy wide international support and qualify for substantial development – not merely emergency – assistance. No one threatens Eritrea’s independence. There is no reason to doubt Ethiopia’s disavowal of any desire to obtain Eritrean territory or regain control of Eritrea as a whole. Why would Ethiopia or any of Eritrea’s neighbours want to absorb a country whose leaders have made a wreck of it?
Could Isaias be taken seriously if he announced adoption of a new democratic, peaceful course? Could the EPLF undergo a convincing transformation into a party promoting genuine democracy and justice? Could Isaias permit a multi-party system to develop? Or a free press where Eritreans could debate solutions to the challenges which confront them? It is, unfortunately, difficult to give a positive answer to any of these questions.
What,
then, is to be Eritrea’s future? I commented at the end of the 1980’s that for
too long the EPLF appeared to be offering the population of Eritrea only two
choices: (1) to join the Arab world or (2) to become an Albania on the Red Sea.
Neither of these choices made much sense and neither is available to
Eritrea
now. While some Arabs are reported to have given the EPLF monetary support in
the recent confrontation in response to Isaias’ s pleadings, Arab leaders know
that the great majority of Eritreans are not Arabs. Even the wealthy Arab states
now lack money to squander on losers. As for the Albanian ‘model’? It was always
an illusion. Communist Albania collapsed more decisively even than Ceausescu’s
Romania and the country is now in worse condition than some of the most
debilitated regions of the former Soviet Union.
Perhaps the best future Eritrea could anticipate would be to become, in effect,
an international protectorate. If a formal international trusteeship could be
devised for post – EPLF Eritrea, the country would be assured of the breathing
space and the inter national support to overcome the most serious disabilities
Isaias and the EPLF have brought upon it. Isaias’s pride and stubbornness are
probably too great to make such a formal arrangement possible. De facto,
however, this may be what will come about. A status approximating a period of
international trusteeship would probably be welcomed by the majority of the
population. Even an informal arrangement of this kind would give the Eritrean
population the opportunity to focus on economic and social development and
evolution toward a democratic political system.
The peoples of Eritrea have proven during the past half century that they are resilient. Over and over again, they have endured hardship and devised successful survival strategies. The million – strong diaspora represents an enormous resource for Eritrea that can be mobilised for positive purposes. The EPLF has made the diaspora an ally abetting its domestic oppression and military adventurism. The money Eritreans living abroad have sent to support Isaias Afewerki has been wasted. The bonds Eritreans abroad have bought will have to be cashed at a drastic discount or simply thrown away. The arms and ammunition money form the diaspora paid for are now in the hands of the Ethiopian army. Mothers, fathers, and relatives to whom diaspora Eritreans sent money for support are suffering severely as a result of the disaster Isaias brought upon the country.
The affection Eritreans in the diaspora have for their homeland can be transformed into a positive force. The diaspora can be mobilised to support democratic reconstruction of Eritrea; the diaspora can help set Eritrea on the road to recovery and prosperity. If the possibilities I sketched in ‘The Economic Challenge’ could be realised, Eritrea could, indeed, become the hub of the Red Sea region and a constructive example for all of Africa. But if the EPLF continues to delude the diaspora and exploit it to prolong its hold on power, the next generation of Eritreans abroad will lose interest in their homeland and be lost to it as the country itself sinks into despair.
Ethiopians and Eritreans know that they are basically the same people. Their fates have been intertwined for three thousand years. The Addis Ababa government has refrained from stirring up hatred of Eritrea. Many of its TPLF – derived leaders have blood ties to Eritrea. Some spent their youth there and went to high school in Asmara. Italian colonialism did not rupture connections between Eritreans and Ethiopians. Neither did British military administration. A significant portion of the Eritrean population is descended from Tigrayans who moved to Eritrea in the first half of the twentieth century. Movement of people in both directions between Ethiopia and Eritrea was normal until Eritrea invaded. The injustices that occurred on both sides when nationals were expelled can, with little lasting damage, be rectified. They need not be allowed to fester. If Frenchmen and Germans, Israelis and Arabs, Japanese and Koreans can be reconciled and live peacefully side by side, certainly this possibility is conceivable for Ethiopians and Eritreans.
Why should European and American governments have become obsessed with the notion of ‘rescuing’ Isaias, a failed authoritarian leader who was not respectful of American and European values? The mistaken determination of American mediators to pursue a ‘balanced’ approach to settling the confrontation left Ethiopians at all levels of society with the suspicion that there was some secret commitment to Isaias and the EPLF on the part of the United States. The suspicion is understandable in light of the irrational pressure to which Ethiopia was subjected by Richard Holbrooke. But the notion made no sense, and the pressure failed. There may have been a peculiar form of racial prejudice against Africans at work here. An African leader such as Meles Zenawi was not seen as entitled to insist on restoration of his country’s territorial integrity when invaded. Ignorance of Ethiopia’s history and the traditions of the country’s leaders was common among officials of the Clinton Administration. So was ignorance of the nature of the EPLF regime in Eritrea. Europeans never seemed so unrealistic about the problem of bringing the confrontation to an end as well-intentioned but naive American mediators did. Neither did most Africans, especially those who sponsored the mediation effort of the OAU.
In the end Americans, Europeans, Africans, the UN and the OAU have no alternative to recognising reality. Ethiopia found itself with no alternative and successfully took matters into its own hands. Ethiopia needs no special efforts to recover from the confrontation – only full resumption of the kinds of support and assistance it has enjoyed since 1991. It is fundamentally a strong country with excellent prospects for results now that it is again able to concentrate the energy and talent of its people on development and modernisation. Eritrea, in contrast, is in tragic circumstances. Its people can, however, rescue themselves from the quagmire into which Isaias and his EPLF have led them. There future is problematic, but not hopeless.
Washington, DC
August 2000